

# SECRET INFORMATION REPORT

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**COUNTRY** Poland

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**SUBJECT** Public Reaction to Political Events

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1. Wide public interest in the Moscow Conference was stimulated by two questions in the Polish mind: would the western frontier be confirmed? would there be peace or war? 25.

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2. The public views the Moscow Conference as a Soviet maneuver for time. The entire Polish nation believes that even if the conference succeeds in drafting a German treaty it will be a half measure born of hard bargaining between Soviets and Anglo-Saxons. It may postpone the storm but will not avert it.
3. The visit of Cyrankiewicz and Minc to Moscow was advertised by the Government press as a great success because it resulted in a more favorable treaty by which Poland received a loan in gold and the USSR surrendered half of its coal demands. The public, however, regards the visit as a mere reporting of the Polish Prime Minister to his superiors in Moscow. Only two provisions of the treaty received popular approval: speedier return of Poles still in USSR camps, and reconversion of the railroad tracks to the former gauge.
4. There was no public reaction to the Polish-Czech treaty. The conviction is general that both Poland and Czechoslovakia, ruled by Communist Parties, are merely obeying Soviet orders.
5. Amnesty and internal stability were the pre-election slogans which secured a victory for the bloc. Although the amnesty was widely publicized and the UB and MO were told to stop their activities during the amnesty period, the plan has failed to eradicate the Underground. Failure of the plan can be attributed to the followings:
  - (a) The amnesty is used by the PPR solely as a means for revealing and exterminating the Underground. Members of the Underground, aware of this attitude, will not jeopardize themselves by taking advantage of the amnesty.

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- (b) The UB did not abide by the terms of the amnesty. It released the innocuous prisoners but retained those who are important in their parties or organizations. Persons whose cases are under investigation also are kept in prison.
- (c) The people have lost all confidence in the authorities and their ability to keep promises.
6. Politically, the people have three alternatives:
- (a) to join one of the recognized "democratic" parties, sacrificing personal opinions and concepts of independence in return for physical and economic security;
- (b) to abide by personal opinions, remain with the PSL, and as a consequence, risk imprisonment; or
- (c) to join the Underground and assist in the fight against illegalities by public exposure of the PPR's aims and activities.

Although it is difficult to predict the nation's choice among these alternatives, it is apparent that few people will choose to risk violence by adherence to personal convictions. Poles want leadership in their opposition, but not if it means civil war and a divided nation.

7. High mortality; the spread of venereal disease brought by the Red Army; tuberculosis caused by famine; lack of respect for life, property, and individual rights--all these constitute a serious threat to Poland's physical and moral well-being.
8. Poland's economic situation is growing steadily worse. Prices are soaring, confidence in the currency is decreasing, and fiscal authorities are imposing drastic restrictions. These trends not only have an enervating effect on the public but are a source of alarm to the Polish Government, the PPR, and the USSR. Meanwhile, the USSR publicly treats Poland like a colony, taking her food, consumer goods, and raw materials, and giving nothing in return.
9. The Polish people demonstrate their growing hatred of the USSR by boycotting Soviet films. Another example of anti-Soviet feeling may be witnessed at the Warsaw stations, particularly at the Warszawa Wschodnia, where Polish children sing songs ridiculing the Soviet Union.

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